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Transforming Consumer Experience: When Timing Matters 
Kathryn A. Braun-LaTour, University of Iowa 
Michael S. LaTour, University of Mississippi 
How advertising can influence or change consumers' product experience has been a topic of 
great interest to marketers. The majority of research has suggested that advertising received prior to an 
experience can exert the most influence. In 1999, however, Braun introduced the concept of 
reconstructive memory, and demonstrated that advertising received after an experience can alter how 
consumers remember their experience. The issue of which order of framing of an experience through 
advertising is most influential on consumer memory has not yet been investigated. A constructive 
memory framework that can take into account both forward- and backward-framing effects and an 
experiment that tests hypotheses regarding the presentation order of advertising and experience is 
presented. The implications for the study of transformational advertising are discussed. 
Advertising has been said to transform consumer experience, that is, rendering it different than 
it might have been with-out the advertising information (Hoch and Deighton 1989; Puto and Wells 
1984). Researchers who have looked at advertising presented before and after the experience have 
concluded that advertising can have the greatest effect on this transformation process when presented 
first (Hoch and Ha 1986; Levin and Gaeth 1988; Marks and Kamins 1988), due to the law of primacy. It is 
therefore not surprising that the majority of the work that deals with the transformative nature of 
marketing communication has been framed to look forward, where the experience is seen as confirming 
or disconfirming expectations generated by advertising (e.g., Boulding et al. 1993; Olson and Dover 
1979). In 1999, Braun published a paper demonstrating that advertising received after an experience 
could act as a "backward frame" and have a significant impact on how that experience was remembered 
and evaluated.  
Braun's work on reconstructive memory put to question earlier research purporting 
advertising's primacy effect on transforming consumer experience. A reconstructive view to memory 
finds that information presented closest to retrieval would be most influential, that is, information 
presented following a consumer experience. However, Braun only looked at the presentation of 
advertising received after an experience. No research yet has considered the role of order of advertising 
presentation for consumer memory of an experience. Nor has research attempted to bridge together 
these disparate research findings on experiential framing to determine whether it is primacy or recency 
that drives how advertising transforms consumer experience (and memory for that experience). 
The purpose of this research is to integrate the forward-and backward-frame effects into a more 
comprehensive model of experiential framing that takes into account both the constructive and 
reconstructive nature of memory. Although the order of information presentation has been one of the 
most investigated issues in social psychology, the conclusions that can be drawn from it for the 
experiential framing situation are weak (see Haugtvedt and Wegener 1994 for a review). Indeed, a 
theoretical explanation that can explain both primacy and recency effects has been missing (Rosnow 
and Robinson 1967). To understand how advertising transforms consumer experience, this research 
posits that not only order, but also time when judgments are made, should be taken into account. We 
begin by reviewing past research on forward framing, and discuss how it has neglected issues involving 
long-term memory. We then present a comprehensive view of memory that better explains how and 
when forward-and backward-framing effects may occur. An experiment that looks at the differential 
effects of order of advertising on consumer memory over short and longer time periods is presented. 
The implications for transformational advertising research are then discussed. 
Conceptual Background 
Forward Framing Review 
 Researchers who have investigated the effect of the order of message presentation on 
experience have generally supported a forward orientation. Hoch and Ha (1986) found that advertising 
influenced judgment to a greater extent when presented first, through encoding processes, than when 
presented later through biased retrieval of the direct product experience. The notion that secondhand 
information is less effective when it is perceived after a direct experience is consistent with results 
reported by Levin and Gaeth (1988), who found the influence of a frame to be somewhat greater when 
presented before the experience of eating ground beef than it was when presented afterward. Similarly, 
Marks and Kamins (1988) found that attitude change is significantly greater for those exposed to an 
advertising-experience sequence than for those exposed to the reverse sequence. Hoch and Deighton 
(1989), summarizing the effects of marketing communication on how consumers learn from their 
experiences, conclude that managers can exert the most influence before an experience ensues.  
Timing of Judgments  
Research supporting the forward framing in marketing, con-ducted in tightly controlled lab 
settings, had concluded that redefinition by advertising after an experience was quite rare (Alba and 
Hasher 1983). The rationale for the external applicability of these forward-framing experimental results 
has been that evaluation occurs spontaneously during a product experience (Fazio, Zanna, and Cooper 
1978), and that information received in advance can direct attention within the product experience and 
influence what gets into the memory bin (Deighton 1984). This view follows a reproductive theory of 
memory that implies that stored mental representations of past experiences are elicited intact during 
recall (Reber 1985). According to this view, advertising information that is introduced after the 
experience is transmitted to the referent bin for permanent storage and should theoretically not affect 
which aspects of the experience can be subsequently recalled (Wyer and Srull 1980).  
Consumer researchers (e.g., Hastie and Park 1986) have distinguished two types of judgments: 
on-line and memory-based. On-line judgments rely on what is currently in working memory, whereas 
memory-based judgments depend on retrieval of information from longer-term storage. These 
judgments involve different brain regions-the hippocampal area in on-line conscious perception of an 
event, the right prefrontal cortex in memory retrieval (Schacter 1996). Depending on one's view of 
memory, the information used during these tasks may also change.  
According to the traditional reproductive view of memory, the outcomes of an on-line and 
memory-based decision should not differ if judgment is made immediately on presentation of the 
information (Feldman and Lynch 1988). Thus, the forward-frame dominance found in the marketing 
laboratory situations should transfer to the real world, where consumers would use a judgment referral 
strategy in which they would call up their previously formed evaluations from memory at some later 
time (Hastie and Park 1986). According to Lingle and Ostrom: "It is possible that the information a 
person selectively samples from memory and considers when making a memory-based judgment will be 
similar in composition to the information available when the initial stimulus-based judgment was made, 
especially when both judgments occur close in time" (1979, p. 180).  
If one considers that memory is reconstructive and continuously changing, however, then one 
has to question whether the forward-frame effects would occur to the same degree in memory-based 
decision making.  
Constructive and Reconstructive Memory  
Memory is a dynamic process, involving encoding, storage, and retrieval. Braun (1999) 
presented a model demonstrating how information interacts in memory (see Figure 1). Her interest was 
in how information presented after an experience altered how consumers remembered their 
experience, as portrayed on the right side of the diagram. In her research, she found that a bad orange 
juice experience could be remembered as being better in retrospect if advertising were received after-
the-fact. The advertising acted as a "backward frame," altering how consumers remembered and 
identified their sensory experience with the juice. She found that the language in the advertising 
"overshadowed" the consumer's direct perceptual experience of the juice, so that in recall, consumers 
incorporated the language of the advertising to express their own experience. Braun notes that the 
majority of advertising re-search has been on the left side of the diagram, where a "for-ward frame" 
theory has been used to account for how prior information acts as a memory schema and influences the 
perception of a current experience (Alba and Hasher 1983; Bower, Black, and Turner 1979). 
Advertising can influence consumers both when it precedes and when it follows an experience. 
To consider its impact on the nature of experience, however, we need to look at the underlying 
processes of perception and memory. The perception of an experience involves information moving 
from a brief sensory store to short-term memory or the working memory system (Baddeley 1994) that 
organizes information as it stores it. Advertising can implicitly color the direct experience by affecting 
how individual neurons code information during the encounter (Merzenich and deCharms 1996). An ad 
viewed prior to a product or service encounter can frame how a consumer perceives it by influencing 
the contents of working memory over the course of the experience. Because consumers are biased to 
"see what they expect to see," images elicited by ads can increase the likelihood of a positive product or 
service experience (Cohen 1996). In that way, the advertising biases how the experience is encoded into 
memory (Hoch and Ha 1986). 
 In the wake of the experience, ads can no longer direct consumers' attentional resources; 
consumers have already learned from their consumption. When an advertisement is received 
postexperience, it can be used to help consumers re-construct their prior experience. Reconstruction is 
more likely when there has been a time lag between the experience and the ad presentation (Braun 
1999). When advertising is presented immediately after an experience, and judgments are made, both 
pieces of information are available in memory and consumers will opt for the more diagnostic one, their 
own experience (Feldman and Lynch 1988). That is, evaluations by consumers who assess their 
experiences immediately after consumption will exhibit a primacy (or forward-frame) effect (as in Hoch 
and Ha 1986; Levin and Gaeth 1988; Marks and Kamins 1988). This prediction is consistent with the 
judgment literature, which finds that primacy effects tend to be greater when participants make on-line 
judgments, because the initial information is used as an anchor and insufficient adjustment occurs 
(Lopes 1982). 
It is suggested that in a memory-based situation, when consumers have had a direct product 
experience, they will attempt to reconstruct it for use in decision making because of its perceived 
diagnosticity over other types of information, such as advertising (Feldman and Lynch 1988). Loftus 
(1982) suggests that this reconstruction process can be influenced by two types of information: schema 
and induced. We have schema reconstruction when people fill in gaps with expected information from 
their general knowledge (which may include information learned previously from advertising or other 
sources), and induced reconstruction when externally presented information such as postexperience 
advertising initiates the recollection process. An ad perceived prior to an experience can act as a schema 
and help to organize the retained information for storage in long-term memory (Wyer et al. 1982). Such 
frames of reference enable consumers to better under-stand and remember their brand experiences.  
Although prior information can be helpful in encoding a subsequent experience, in the memory-
based decision environment we would expect an ad frame that comes after to exert more influence by 
serving as a cue to reconstruct memories of the experience (Feldman and Lynch 1988). Others suggest 
that the encoding of an experience for which consumers have no reference frame might be subject to 
even more constructive retrieval processes because of the absence of restraints on its formation (Alba 
et al. 1981).  
Although it is suspected that advertising can exert both forward- and backward-frame effects on 
evaluation, one of the purposes of presenting the constructive memory framework is to distinguish how 
advertising exerts an impact on the process. Strategic memory retrieval is a two-step process involving 
an initial guided memory search where the information is retrieved from long-term memory, and then 
followed by a monitoring process that evaluates the outcome of the search. To differentiate the 
memory processes evoked in remembering, some researchers have assessed the phenomenological 
aspects of recall. For instance, upon asking participants to remember their experience, in addition to the 
memory content, they are also asked how the memory felt to them.... did it seem like they were reliving 
the event, or did it seem more vague, familiar somehow to them, but they couldn't explain why. Endel 
Tulving (1985) distinguished these two states as "remembering" and "knowing," and psychologists and 
marketers have used this measure to gain insight into the quality or feeling associated with the 
remembering (e.g., Braun 1999; Dewhurst and Conway 1994; Gardiner 1988; Rajaram 1993). Tulving 
proposed that the probability of the "remember" response could serve as an index of the extent to 
which autonoetic (explicit) consciousness is involved in the recovery of past events, where "know" 
represents semantic or declarative knowledge. These two different states can be informative to 
advertising researchers as well; for instance, advertising that causes one to feel his or her experience 
again ("remembering" it) might be considered to have more of an impact than an advertisement that 
leads to more general knowing of an event.  
This research investigation also assesses whether consumers are aware of the impact 
advertising has on their evaluations. This aspect of the research has practical implications for advertising 
studies that have employed self-reported measures of the influence of ad campaigns as well as public 
policy issues. Due to an illusion of control bias concerning their own experiences (Langer 1975), 
consumers' capacity to detect the intrusion of advertising might be diminished. Deighton speculated 
that "for mundane and inconsequential product choices, the consumer may adopt a hypothesis (from 
advertising) on such slight grounds that s/he would be reluctant to acknowledge its role to others" 
(1984, p. 767). This unaware-ness of influence is consistent with research on memory-based decision 
making (Braun 1999). Consumers might believe their decision making to be driven by their own 
experiences, un-aware that external information can distort their memories (Loftus and Pickrell 1995). 
Schacter (1996) notes that the feeling associated with remembering, that is, of re-experiencing the past, 
can trick us into believing in the accuracy of our recollections regardless of their actual veridicality.  
While past research has speculated that advertising received prior to an experience can alter the 
consumers' actual experience, no research yet in the forward-framing literature has found a change in 
the actual sensory perception of the experience. For instance, while consumers in the Olson and Dover 
(1979) study said the coffee was less bitter when they had received advertising, there was no way to 
gauge whether or not they actually tasted (experienced) a different coffee than those who did not 
receive the advertising. In Braun's (1999) study, however, consumers who received the postexperience 
advertising identified having tasted a different (better) juice than they had actually consumed.  
Experimental Overview  
The present study was designed to isolate the effects of an advertising message on consumers' 
evaluations of a taste experience, taking into account when judgments are made. The on-line decision 
environment follows past framing paradigms wherein the advertising frame is presented immediately 
be-fore or after the product experience, and an evaluation is made immediately after all information has 
been received. For the memory-based situation, the advertising information was presented before or 
after the experience and a distraction task (as per Braun 1999).  
Following Braun (1999), our stimuli were orange juice and very favorable print advertising. We 
chose to investigate the worst orange juice Braun tested in her study (which was mixed with water, 
vinegar, and salt). Typically, the more ambiguous experiences have been the ones most subject to 
change (Hoch and Ha 1986). One of the most surprising aspects of Braun's 1999 study, however, was the 
finding that even a really bad orange juice-one that was watered down and tinged with vinegar and salt-
could be made more favorable in retrospect. Might similar findings occur if no time had passed and 
judgments were made immediately? Or might contrast occur? The present research is designed to 
investigate what may become either a boundary effect in the framing literature, or to extend the 
framing research to a wider array of product experiences.  
As in Braun (1999), our measures of interest included the recall (in the memory-based situation) 
or description (in the on-line environment) of participants' taste experience, and within those 
statements, we were interested in the length, the valence of the words, and whether participants had 
usurped words from the advertising to represent their own experience. We also included a recognition 
test where participants were asked to identify the sample they had recently tasted from among four 
other choices, and as they made their choice, to indicate their confidence, and whether the choice 
involved "remembering," "knowing," or "guessing." Consistent with the judgment (or framing literature), 
we also had participants form an overall evaluation of their experience and indicate how they came to 
their judgment (i.e., what sources of information were used). Because tasting the orange juice was such 
a bad experience, the transformative impact of the advertising could be assessed through its ability to 
make the recall more positive, identification of the perceptual experience more favorable, and the 
overall evaluation higher. 
Hypotheses 
Our first hypotheses are presented to compare the on-line versus memory views of framing and 
to predict an interaction effect: 
Hypothesis 1a: Following the work of Levin and Gaeth (1988), Hoch and Ha (1986), and Marks and 
Kamins (1988), we posit that consumers asked to make a judgment about information presented serially 
in an on-line form will show a primacy effect, where by advertising presented before the product 
experience will influence the experience description, identification, and overall evaluation more than 
advertising presented afterward.  
Hypothesis 1b: Replicating Braun (1999), and building on the reconstructive view of memory, we expect 
consumers asked to make an evaluation sometime after a product experience will be subject to a 
recency effect, where by the advertising received after the product experience will exert greater effect 
on recall, identification, and evaluation than if received before the experience.  
The following hypothesis predicts a main effect of time:  
Hypothesis 2: A time lag will increase the likelihood of reconstruction, resulting in the advertising 
exerting even greater effect on the evaluation of the experience, because the experience will decay in 
memory, and the advertising will be used to "fill in" the gaps as memory reconstruction occurs. This will 
be indicated in the recall/description measures, identification, and overall evaluation. 
The following hypothesis relates to the ecphory of the experience and relates specifically to the 
memory-based conditions where remembering is involved: 
Hypothesis 3: Tulving's R/K measure (which asks participants to identify whether their memory is 
associated with “remembering” or “knowing”) will differentiate advertising's influence on encoding and 
retrieval processes. We expect more" remembering" when the ad is a cue for reconstruction, that is, 
when the experience has had time to fade and the advertisement is presented close to retrieval. 
An overall hypothesis regarding the awareness of influence in the framing process is presented: 
Hypothesis 4: Consistent with past research, we expect consumers to have little awareness as to how 
much the advertising has influenced their memories and judgments. We expect consumers to indicate 
that they rely more on their experience when making decisions than on the advertising information. 
Experimental Investigation 
Participants 
The participants were 180 undergraduates (82 female, 98 male) who received course credit for 
their involvement.  
Design 
A two-order (ad comes before and after experience) X two-time (on-line and memory-based 
judgments) between-subjects design was used. Control was provided by running baseline measures for 
both the judgment and memory-based situations where participants received the taste experience but 
no advertising. Participants were randomly assigned to one of these six conditions. 
Method  
Efforts were made to make the experiment as similar as possible to Braun (1999). Participants 
came to the setting expecting an orange juice taste test. The same cover story was used, where the 
experimenter said she was running the study for an outside company and that participants should 
report only their true feelings about the juice, even if it was negative, because truthful feedback would 
most benefit the company. Depending on their experimental condition, participants either first received 
a two-ounce sample of the "bad" juice or received the same two ads used in the Braun 1999 study. One 
ad featured the historical origins of the company; the other was comparative, touting the freshness and 
quality of Orange Grove's oranges and superior distribution system. Those in the ad-first conditions 
were given five minutes to review and rate the advertising. Those in the experience-first conditions were 
told that this Orange Grove juice was new to the market and that they should evaluate the taste. 
Participants in the on-line conditions were given the other piece of information-advertising or 
taste immediately following. Their evaluations of the orange juice were made right after that last piece 
of information had been received. Participants in the memory conditions who received the advertising 
first received the same five-minute background distraction as had been used in Braun (1999) between 
the advertising and experience. Those participants then tasted the Orange Grove juice and had a longer, 
15-minute distraction, before they filled out the questionnaire. Participants in the after-experience 
memory condition followed the same timing as Braun (1999): After they tasted the juice, they received a 
15-minute distraction, followed by the advertising evaluation, then an-other five-minute background 
information distraction where they filled out some background information regarding on-line activity 
and media usage, and then, finally, the questionnaire. Participants in the control conditions tasted the 
juice, and in the on-line condition, they immediately evaluated it; in the memory condition, they were 
presented with the 15- minute distraction as well as the five-minute background survey distraction 
before evaluating the juice.  
Consistent with Braun 1999, the questionnaire began with having participants recall (or describe 
for the on-line conditions) in their own words their taste experience with Orange Grove juice. They were 
asked to pick three words that best described their memory of Orange Grove's taste. Then came the 
identification task. Participants were given five samples of orange juice and were asked to identify the 
one they re-membered having tasted earlier in the hour. They were told that one among the five 
samples was exactly as they had tasted earlier. The samples were numbered 1 to 5, with 1 being the 
worst tasting and 5 being the best (these samples followed the same recipe as used in Braun 1999, with 
sample 2 representing the juice they had tasted). They were told to sample each in numeric order and to 
defer making identification until all five had been sampled. They were offered crackers to cleanse their 
palate between each sample. 
After sampling, participants were asked to distinguish between states of awareness using the 
process developed by Tulving (1985), where they were to indicate a "remember" judgment if their 
identification approached a reexperiencing of the product, that is, if they could taste the juice "in their 
mind's eye"; a "know" judgment if their identification was based more on familiarity; and a "guess" if 
their identification strategy involved randomly guessing one of the samples to be a match. They also 
rated their confidence that their identification was correct, on a scale anchored by 0 (not at all sure 
correct) to 100 (extremely sure correct).  
Participants then formed overall evaluations on the juice on the same eight scales used by Braun 
(1999). These were 10-point scales, where more favorable evaluations received higher scores. Three 
additional scales were added to investigate consumers' decision strategies: "How well did the 
advertising information represent your own taste experience with the OJ?"; "How well do you believe 
the advertising fairly represented the juice?”; and "Did you rely more on the advertising or your taste 
experience when making your judgments?" If the participant relied more on the advertising, he or she 
would circle a number closest to the left side of the scale, and if the participant relied more on his or her 
taste experience, he or she would circle a number toward the right end. These were 10-point scales, 
with higher numbers indicating more agreement and fairness to the advertising (for the first two scales), 
and more reliance on the taste experience on judgment (third scale). Participants were also given an 
open-ended question that asked them to explain how they formed their judgments of Orange Grove 
juice. 
Results 
Coding Procedure 
Two independent judges coded participants' recall statements of their taste experiences. They 
had no knowledge of the experimental hypotheses. Their interrater reliability was .95, and an average 
was used for the analysis. 
Recall 
Participants had five minutes to describe in detail their memory (or experience, for the on-line 
conditions) of their taste experience of Orange Grove juice. The judges coded the number of words, the 
number of independent thoughts, the number of positive and negative thoughts, the number of ad 
words used in the recall statement, and the number of positive, negative, and ad words chosen to 
describe the juice. The results by condition appear in Table 1. 
We did a preliminary analysis and found that all the ad conditions were significantly more 
positive than the control conditions (this was true also for recognition and evaluation measures). 
Because our primary interest was in investigating how the order and timing of the ads influenced 
consumers' recall and judgments about the taste of the orange juice, the analysis includes only the ad 
conditions. As per Hypothesis 1a, we expected lesser effects when the ad came after the experience 
when judgments were made immediately, and per Hypothesis 1b, greater effects when the ad followed 
the experience in the memory situation. Overall, we expected the ads to exert greater influence over 
time, in the memory conditions, as per Hypothesis 2. We used ANOVA (analysis of variance) to test 
these hypotheses, with time and order and their interaction as the factors and the recall items as the 
dependent variables. It was expected that time would be a significant factor (where longer time would 
yield greater influence) and the interaction would also be significant (and follow-up tests would reveal 
specific pat-terns of influence). We'll begin with a discussion of the measures of length: words and 
thoughts. (Note: No specific hypothesis was forwarded regarding the length of the recall statements; the 
purpose here was to get a gauge of how much was written.) The overall model was significant for the 
amount written, F(3, 119) = 5.64, p = .0012, and time was significant at F(1, 119) = 10.64, p < .0015, with 
Bonferonni post hoc tests finding significantly more words for the on-line conditions, M = 29, than the 
memory conditions, M = 22. The interaction was also significant, F(1, 119) = 5.25, p = .02, where the 
after condition had a significantly longer recall in the on-line than in the memory condition; these 
conditions were also found to be significantly different at p < .05 in post hoc tests. The model for the 
number of thoughts was not significant. 
Our hypotheses dealt with the content of the recall statements. Here the overall model for 
percentage of positive thoughts was significant, F(3, 119) = 10.17, p < .0001, and both time and the 
interaction were significant: F(1, 119) = 12.71, p = .0005 for time, and F(1, 119) = 17.42, p < .0001 for the 
interaction. The main effect of time showed more positive thoughts for the memory conditions, 54%, 
than the on-line period, 29%, significantly different at p < .05. As predicted, for the on-line condition, 
there were more positive thoughts when the ad preceded the experience than when it followed; the 
opposite was true in the memory conditions, where the postexperience advertising exerted the most 
influence. Post hoc tests found these conditions to be significantly different. The percentage of negative 
thoughts told a similar story: The overall model was significant at F(3, 119) = 7.39, p = .0001, and both 
time, F(1, 119) = 13.96, p = .0003, and the interaction, F(1, 119) = 8.21, p = .005, were significant factors. 
Post hoc tests revealed less negative thoughts (29%) in the memory conditions than in the on-line 
conditions (49%). The interaction revealed the same pattern as with the positive thoughts, where in the 
on-line condition there were less negative thoughts when the ads preceded the experience, and in the 
memory condition there were less negative thoughts when the ads followed the experience. These 
findings are consistent with what we predicted in Hypothesis 1a and Hypothesis 1b, where the before-
experience presentation exerts greatest influence when it comes first when judgments are made on-
line, and when judgments are made over time (memory-based), the after-experience ad exerts the most 
influence. Also, consistent with Hypothesis 2, the ads exert more influence on judgment as time passes, 
regardless of the order of presentation.  
Braun (1999) suggests that the transformational words used in the advertising (i.e., words such 
as "fresh," "sweet," "pulpy," and "pure," which directly referenced the taste of the juice and were 
designed to conjure up that experience in the reader's mind) "overshadowed" the experience, causing 
the participants to remember a different-tasting juice. In the typical overshadowing study, the verbal 
information is presented after the perceptual experience. As a type of source confusion error, Braun 
found that those who received the advertising were more likely to use the ad words to describe their 
own taste experience. In the present study, we found similar results. However, the verbal information 
from the advertising also influenced the schema of the taste perception when it preceded the 
experience. We found the overall model for the ad words to be significant, F(3, 119) = 5.83, p = .001, but 
only the interaction was significant, F(1, 119) = 21.67, p = .0002. Participants used significantly more ad 
words when the ad preceded the experience in the on-line condition (as compared to the after 
condition), and significantly more ad words when it followed (rather than preceded) the experience in 
the memory-based conditions. It appears that the usurping of words is part of advertising's framing 
effect overall. 
The participants had the opportunity to pick three words (free recall, no list provided) they felt 
best represented Orange Grove's taste. These were coded for positive, negative, and ad-based content. 
For the positive word content, the over-all model was significant at F(3, 119) = 8.9, p < .0001; time was 
significant at F(1, 1 19) = 15.35, p = .0002; and the interaction was significant at F(1, 119) = 9.08, p = 
.003. As with the recall statements, there were significantly more positive words used in the memory 
conditions, M = 1.80, than in the on-line conditions, M = 1.0. And as with the differential or-der 
hypothesis (Hypothesis 1a and Hypothesis 1b), there were more positive words used when the ad 
preceded the experience in the on-line conditions and when the ad followed the experience in the 
memory-based conditions. Not surprisingly, based on the previous findings, the negative words followed 
a similar pattern. The overall model was significant at F(3, 119) = 5.48, p = .0015; time was significant at 
F(1, 119) = 6.81, p = .01; and the interaction was significant at F(1, 119) = 9.61, p = .002. There were 
significantly more negative words used in the on-line conditions than the memory conditions, M = 1.2 
versus M = .7. There were significantly more negative words used when the ads followed the experience 
in the on-line condition and when the ads preceded the experience in the memory condition. The model 
for the ad words was not significant. As the reader will note in Table 1, all conditions used the ad words 
to describe the juice's taste. 
As stated earlier, we found all advertising conditions to be significantly more positive in recall 
than the control conditions. In other words, a frame effect occurred despite the high contrast between 
the bad juice and the favorable advertising. Even with the condition that showed the greatest degree of 
contrast, when the ad followed the experience in the on-line condition, there was influence by the 
advertising. These results replicate Braun (1999) and extend the forward-framing results to 
unambiguous experiences (Hoch and Ha 1986). For instance, Levin and Gaeth predict that at some point 
there should be a contrast effect: “If the ground beef tastes terrible, for example, it is unlikely that even 
a powerful positive frame will lead to a favorable evaluation” (1988, p. 378). 
Memory Identification  
Participants were asked to pick the sample that they had tasted earlier. The distributions for 
each condition appear in Table 2. 
Our interest was in whether or not the advertising information would positively transform the 
perceptual memories of consumers' taste experiences indicated by participants' willingness to choose a 
more favorable sample to represent their original experience if they received the ads. A categorical data 
analysis procedure was used to analyze the means of the conditions, with time, order, and the 
interaction as factors. We found all factors to be significant: time, χ2(N = 120) = 6.71, p = .0096; order, 
χ2(N = 120) = 9.46, p = .002; and the interaction, χ2(N = 120) = 22.04, p < .0001. The on-line condition 
showed less influence, M = 2.45, than the memory-based condition, M = 2.96. The order effect was 
driven by the inter-action due to the lack of effect, almost contrast, in the on-line after-experience 
condition, with M = 2.43 for after and M = 3.0 for before. As found in the recall statements, the type of 
order effect depended on time: The before-experience in the on-line condition had a higher 
identification score, M = 3.23, than the after-experience condition, M = 1.63, and the after-experience 
condition had higher identifications in the memory situation, M = 3.13, than the before-experience, M = 
2.80. Notice the greater difference, however, in the on-line condition: The ad appears to make 
identification much more negative when it follows the experience, resulting in almost a contrast effect 
in judgment, which could explain why past framing researchers had concluded that advertising received 
after an experience was not an effective strategy.  
Tulving's R/K (and added “G”) was used to differentiate how the advertising had influenced the 
memory of the juice: Higher numbers of "remember" judgments would demonstrate more influence at 
retrieval, whereas more "know" judgments would indicate more influence at the encoding, thus testing 
Hypothesis 3. We did not expect any differences in the reporting of these judgments in the on-line 
conditions, as the experience was available in working memory; hence, there was no need to 
reconstruct the taste experience. We expected that if the advertising was exerting more influence on 
retrieval in the after conditions, there would be more reporting of "re-member" in the memory 
condition than if the ad preceded the experience, where it would more likely influence the en-coding of 
the experience. Because advertising is likely to influence the experience in both these ways, it is 
important to find a measure that can differentiate these effects. We found more "remembering" in the 
memory-after condition, 60%, than in the memory-before condition, 33%, significantly different at χ2(N 
= 60) = 4.28, p = .03. There were no such differences observed in the on-line condition.  
Unlike the R/K/G measure, the confidence measure did not differentiate at all between 
conditions; all conditions reported confidence to be around 66 to 68 on the 100-point scale. The ad 
conditions showed similar confidence by those who did not receive the advertising (control) conditions. 
These results are also consistent with Braun (1999), who found that even the most misled consumers 
were highly confident in their decisions. 
To provide some insight into why the ads may be exerting greater influence over time, we 
compared the control conditions where judgments/memories were taken in the on-line and memory-
based time frames. Hypothesis 2 predicts that over time, the experience will fade, allowing the 
advertising to exert more influence. We found greater accuracy in identification within the on-line time 
frame, 56%, versus 33% in the memory-based time frame, significantly different at χ2(N = 60) = 3.29, p = 
.06. 
Overall Evaluations 
An interesting question is whether the advertising made the participants enjoy their experience 
more, or dislike the experience less. Figure 2 charts the means of the overall evaluation index (and 
provides a more detailed description of the measures involved in that index). The eight subjective 
measures loaded on one factor, with coefficient a of .95. They were combined to form an index of 
subjective evaluation. The over-all model was found to be significant at F(3, 119)= 7.11, p = .002, with 
time significant at F(1, 119) = 9.65, p = .002 and the interaction significant at F(1, 119) = 1 1.56, p = 
.0009. Again, the advertising exerted more influence over time, with M = 4.26 for the on-line condition, 
and M = 5.6 for the memory-based condition. Evaluations were significantly higher when the advertising 
preceded the experience in the on-line condition, and when the advertising followed the experience in 
the memory-based condition. If one considers the midpoint of the scale as an "average" rating, it 
appears that "liking" for the juice only developed in the memory conditions; participants in the on-line 
conditions just disliked the juice less. 
Usage of Information  
The usurping of the advertising words in the participants' re-call statements is an indirect 
measure of source monitoring errors: They believed those words represented their own experience 
when in fact they unknowingly “borrowed” them from the advertising. At the end of the experiment, we 
were interested in how the participants perceived how they made their evaluations and judgments. 
Would they readily acknowledge the influence the advertising had on their judgments? Or would they 
believe it was their own taste experience that drove their evaluations, as predicted in Hypothesis 4? We 
first looked at what the participants wrote in the open-ended question that asked them to describe how 
they came to evaluate Orange Grove juice. A large majority said "taste," and a large subset of those 
mentioned that they compared the taste of Orange Grove to other juices they had tasted. There was no 
mention of the advertising having influenced those taste judgments.  
 
 
On the scales, participants rated how they perceived the advertising, that is, whether they 
thought it "matched" their own experience and how fair they thought it was. These measures were 
found to be highly correlated, r = .81, so they were combined. This combined scale was found to be 
negatively correlated with the third scale, r = -.21, which reported how much reliance was placed on the 
experience versus advertising, thus indicating that the more participants felt they relied on their own 
experience, the less they believed the advertising was fair and matched their own experience. This 
combined fairness measure was found to be positively correlated with the distortion of memory 
identification, so that people who felt the advertising was fair and matched their experience were more 
likely to pick a favorable juice to match their memory, r = .34. The self-report reliance on experience was 
not found to be correlated with memory identification, r = -.01. 
We also looked at whether these usage measures varied across conditions. Consistent with 
Braun (1999), we found that most participants thought they were relying on their own experience the 
most when making judgments, M = 8.5, for all conditions. However, the fairness measure did 
differentiate between those who were more influenced by the advertising: The overall model was 
significant at F(3, 119) = 4.22, p = .007; time was significant at F(1, 119) = 5.66, p = .019, and the 
interaction was significant at F(1, 119) = 7.00, p = .009. The ad was perceived as more fair and like their 
own experience in the memory conditions, M = 5.8, than in the on-line conditions, M = 4.7. The ad was 
seen as fairer in those conditions that were most influenced by the advertising: The before-experience 
in the on-line condition, M = 5.3, versus the after-experience in the on-line condition, M = 4.2, and the 
after-experience in the memory condition, M = 6.4, versus the before-experience in the memory 
condition, M = 5.2. 
General Discussion 
Academic research on the framing of consumers' experiences has had significant consequences 
for the design of advertising strategy (Hoch and Deighton 1989), where managers had been urged to 
present their advertising prior to the consumer experience. Braun's (1999) study suggested another 
strategy; using postexperience advertising to alter consumers' memories of their experiences. 
The purpose of this research investigation was to both replicate and extend Braun's 1999 paper 
by studying the effects of time and order of advertising presentation on consumers' memories and 
evaluations of their direct taste experience. We replicated Braun's 1999 research finding that 
postexperience advertising could alter memory for that experience (our Hypothesis 1b), and extended it 
by demonstrating that prior received advertising could also contaminate the memory for the experience 
(though not to the same degree). We also found results consistent with judgment researchers' studies 
(e.g., Hoch and Ha 1986; Levin and Gaeth 1988) that find advertising can exert more influence prior to 
an experience when judgments are made on-line (Hypothesis 1a).  
In addition to finding this interaction effect, we found an overall main effect of advertising on 
transforming the experience. Braun (1999) found that a very bad experience could be altered in 
retrospect through very good advertising. Judgment researchers, however, who have mainly studied 
framing in on-line situations have concluded: "Even 'great' advertising is not going to make soyburgers 
taste better, double-knit leisure suits fit snugger, or Yugo cars ride smoother. These products provide 
clear-cut evidence not open to multiple interpretations" (Hoch and Ha 1986, p. 359). Now we are not so 
sure-even a very unambiguous taste experience was found to be influenced by the advertising. Note 
that the unambiguous bad taste of the juice can be verified in Table 1, where there were 0% positive 
words used by participants in the control condition.  
The way advertising's primacy and recency affect experience transformation has to do with the 
timing. These differences in outcomes can be explained by the types of memory systems that exert the 
most influence on judgment. Memory-based conditions rely on long-term explicit retrieval, which is 
influenced by recently received information. Advertising presented in advance biases attentional 
resources during the experience, affecting the on-line condition, which taps working memory. This same 
prior information is used to organize the experience for storage, but it exerts less influence than if 
received just before recall. That different types of memory systems were at play in this experiment was 
evidenced by participants' reporting on the phenomenological qualities of their recollection, that is, 
whether they "remembered" the taste (meaning they could taste it in their mind's eye) or just "knew" it 
to be the correct one. The higher percentage of "remember" judgments for memory-based conditions 
when the ad is close to retrieval suggests greater use of advertising as a retrieval cue (Hypothesis 3).  
Previous forward-framing studies looked only at how advertising affected overall judgments of a 
product. By distinguishing in this study between participants' own memories of past experiences 
(recognition) and their overall judgments, we were able to determine how internalized the advertising 
information had become that it did indeed "transform" the consumer experience. As in Braun's 1999 
study, we found that when advertising acts in this manner, consumers rate their reliance on their own 
experience as high and advertising in-formation as low when making judgments (Hypothesis 4). 
Consumers are therefore not consciously aware of the intrusion that advertising has either on the 
construction or reconstruction of their experiences.  
We shall now discuss our results in terms of how advertising managers can shape consumer 
experience, and consider some limitations and areas for future research. 
Implications for Transforming Experiences  
Whether one views memory as a stable "memory bin" or as a constructive or reconstructive 
process has implications for advertising managers. For instance, Hoch and Deighton (1989, p. 8), suggest 
that memory reconstruction occurs only after long time periods and "may be more likely when 
outcomes are separated in time from original actions" (Snyder and Uranowitz 1978). Because consumers 
in natural settings generally do not encounter information in rapid sequential order as in the typical 
framing experiment, it is reasonable to question what Hoch and Deighton (1989) meant by "outcomes ... 
separated in time from original actions." Thus far, no one has tested the boundaries of the effects of 
time on consumers' learning from experience. We found time to interact with order in this investigation; 
past framing findings of supporting forward-framing dominance held only in the on-line situation.  
This interaction enabled us to assess when the forward framing might be most likely to occur, 
such as on in-store advertising seen close to sampling. These forward-framing effects are likely to have 
their intended impact when they are consistent with assumptions and help shape the emergent 
expectations about a product or service outcome (e.g., Stayman, Alden, and Smith 1992). The forward-
frame effects, though important, are only part of the framing story. 
Alba, Hutchinson, and Lynch contend: "We have taken the relatively extreme position that the 
effects of long-term memory are so pervasive and fundamental as to cast doubt on the existence of any 
purely stimulus-based decisions in the real world. The basis for our position lies not only in the fact that 
few consumer decisions take place in the presence of complete information, but also in the belief that 
memory exerts itself even in stimulus-intense environments through its effects on attention and 
perception" (1991, p. 36). 
Backward-frame effects may be more prevalent and are consistent with other findings in 
consumer research. Lodish's market-level data finds that advertising is most likely to be noticed after a 
consumer has bought the advertised product (Lodish et al. 1995). Studies of dissonance reduction 
(Cohen and Goldberg 1970) suggest that people may use postdecision information to reinforce the 
merits of a decision, thereby creating after-the-fact a greater sense of confidence in their initial decision 
than they may have actually experienced. The backward-framing effects are most likely to happen in 
situations for which consumers have had an experience, and as they decide whether or not to 
repurchase, they attempt to reconstruct that experience in their mind. Even communications intended 
to frame forward may also frame backward. For instance, advertising intended to influence cur-rent 
beliefs to encourage repeat purchase, brand switching, or even new product trial, may inadvertently 
alter interpretations of relevant prior consumption experiences. 
Aaker and Stayman (1992) note the difficulty in studying the transformational effects of 
advertising and the lack of re-search on capturing the core concept, the actual difference in the 
perceptual experience accounted for by the secondhand information. Managers interested in studying 
how their campaigns influence consumers' perception and memories can use the present paradigm and 
its measures as a guide. For in-stance, one might show consumers different versions of the target ads 
before/after they experience the product. Thereafter, the company would take an assessment of that 
experience by asking them to recall/describe that experience in their own words. The company could 
determine the effectiveness of the different ads to transform by their ability to infiltrate those recall 
statements. In addition, by asking consumers to rate their memory using Tulving's R/K distinction, one 
can deter-mine how well the advertising interacted in the creation of an emotional recollection of that 
experience. 
Future Research and Limitations 
The present research is limited, as is any laboratory research, by the conditions under which 
data were collected. Braun (1999) found that over time, even more reconstruction occurred, so we 
would expect, had we had a week between the experience and the memory, that there would have 
been even more constructive effects due to the advertising. In addition, this research was conducted on 
a sample with an average age of 22; had we extended our subject base to include much younger and 
older consumers, we might have seen even more of an effect due to the advertising suggestion 
(Schacter 1996). Also, we chose to use the same design and stimuli as Braun (1999) in order to do as 
close a replication as possible. To be able to generalize the findings to other products, one might 
consider looking at products for which there are higher search or credence attributes than the more 
experience-based product studied in this research. Furthermore, since the advertising message quality 
might lead to different levels of effect, future research might consider varying the credibility or the 
format of the advertising. 
In this research study, we attempted to limit the role prior knowledge would play (as a schema) 
by using a fictitious brand of orange juice (which was also done to be consistent with past framing 
research). We note that when our participants were asked about their decision strategy, the majority 
mentioned that they compared Orange Grove to other brands they had tested. So although we were 
able to rule out a prior brand schema of Orange Grove as having an effect on evaluation, the 
participants did use prior knowledge to come to their evaluations. Future research might consider 
testing a new-to-the world product where prior knowledge would be low. Or, research might consider 
the role of prior knowledge, such as whether or not more "expert" consumers would be less influenced 
by the advertising. Also, future research might consider advertising variables that best engineer the 
consumer experience in the short and long term: Might there be different techniques involved for on-
line and memory experience framing? 
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